James Rickards : LTCM 破綻時、3日で 40億ドルを工面した


・LTCM が破綻し、世界経済が崩壊の瀬戸際に至った当時の逸話を紹介した過去記事が下。

  James Rickards から聞いた LTCM での体験 (2015-05-26)

・最近、James Rickards がこの当時の状況を述べている記事をまた書いているので紹介する。上の過去記事では登場しない内容も含まれており、興味深い内容となっている。


The 2008 crisis is still fresh in people’s minds. People know a lot less about 1998, partly because it was almost 20 years ago. It was right in the middle of that crash. It was an international monetary crisis that started in Thailand in June of 1997, spread to Indonesia and Korea, and then finally Russia by August of ’98. Everyone was building a firewall around Brazil. It was exactly like dominoes falling.

Think of countries as dominoes where Thailand falls followed by Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea and then Russia. The next domino was going to be Brazil, and everyone (including the IMF and the United States) said, “Let’s build a firewall around Brazil and make sure Brazil doesn’t collapse.”

Then came Long-Term Capital Management. The next domino was not a country. It was a hedge fund, although it was a hedge fund that was as big as a country in terms of its financial footings. I was the general counsel of that firm. I negotiated that bailout. I think a many of my readers might be familiar with my role there. The importance of that role is that I had a front-row seat.

I’m in the conference room, in the deal room, at a big New York law firm. There were hundreds of lawyers. There were 14 banks in the LTCM bailout fund. There were 19 other banks in a one billion dollar unsecured credit facility. Included were Treasury officials, Federal Reserve officials, other government officials, Long-Term Capital, our partners. It was a thundering herd of lawyers, but I was on point for one side of the deal and had to coordinate all that.

It was a 4 billion dollar all-cash deal, which we put together in 72 hours with no due diligence. Anyone who’s raised money for his or her company, or done deals can think about that and imagine how difficult it would be to get a group of banks to write you a check for 4 billion dollars in 3 days.

Those involved can say they bailed out Long-Term capital. They really bailed out themselves. If Long-Term Capital had failed, and it was on the way to failure, 1.3 trillion dollars of derivatives would’ve been flipped back to Wall Street.

The banks involved would’ve had to run out and cover that 1.3 trillion dollars in exposure, because they thought they were hedged. They had one side of the trade with Long-Term and had the other side of the trade with each other.

When you create that kind of hole in everyone’s balance sheets and everyone has to run and cover, every market in the world would’ve been closed. Not just bond markets or stock markets. Banks would’ve failed sequentially. It would’ve been what came close to happening in 2008.

Very few people knew about this. There were a bunch of lawyers there, but we were all one floor of a big New York law firm. The Fed was on the phone. We moved the money. We got it done. They issued a press release.

It was like foaming an airport runway. You’ve got a jet aircraft with a lot of passengers and four engines in flames, and you foam the runways. The fire trucks are standing by, and somehow you land it and put out the fire. Life went on.

After that, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates twice, once at a scheduled FOMC meeting on September 29, 1998, and again at an unscheduled meeting. The Fed can do that. The Fed doesn’t have to have a meeting. They can just do an executive committee-type meeting on the phone, and that’s what they did. That was the last time, in October 15, 1998, that the Fed cut interest rates outside of a scheduled meeting. It was done to “put out the fire.” Life went on.

ソース: https://dailyreckoning.com/the-road-to-ruin-2/





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